



# COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA

Office of the Attorney General

**Robert F. McDonnell**  
Attorney General

900 East Main Street  
Richmond, Virginia 23219  
804-786-2071  
FAX 804-786-1991  
Virginia Relay Services  
800-828-1120  
7-1-1

October 9, 2008

Daniel M. Siegel, Esq.  
Town Attorney for Charlotte Court House  
P.O. Box 1998  
Richmond, Virginia 23218

Dear Mr. Siegel:

I am responding to your request for an official advisory opinion in accordance with § 2.2-505 of the *Code of Virginia*.

## Issue Presented

You ask whether the Town of Charlotte Court House is authorized to appoint a town sergeant and any other necessary officers to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth within the Town. You also ask whether Charlotte Court House is authorized to enter into a reciprocal agreement with the Town of Drakes Branch pursuant to § 15.2-1726.

## Response

It is my opinion that the Town of Charlotte Court House is authorized to appoint a town sergeant and any other necessary officers to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth within the Town. It further is my opinion that Charlotte Court House is authorized to enter into a reciprocal agreement with the Town of Drakes Branch pursuant to § 15.2-1726.

## Background

You advise that the Town Charter (the "Charter") for the Town of Charlotte Court House provides that the Town "shall have and may exercise all powers which are now or hereafter may be conferred upon or delegated to towns under the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, as fully and completely as though such powers were specifically enumerated herein."<sup>1</sup> The Charter further provides that the town council may appoint "a town sergeant, who shall be the conservator of the peace."<sup>2</sup>

You also advise that Charlotte Court House has entered into a reciprocal agreement with Drakes Branch for the provision of law enforcement assistance for the period from July 1, 2008 through June 30, 2009. Under the terms of the agreement, the officer serving as Drakes Branch's town sergeant will

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<sup>1</sup> 1989 Va. Acts ch. 117, § 2.1, at 162, 162.

<sup>2</sup> *Id.*, § 4.1, at 163-64. Section 4.2 of the Charter provides that appointees serve at the pleasure of the council. *Id.* at 164.

provide law-enforcement assistance to Charlotte Court House for a total of fourteen hours per week at the rate of \$28.00 per hour.

You conclude that because the charters for the towns of Drakes Branch and Charlotte Court House authorize the towns to appoint a police force, both towns have the authority under § 15.2-1726 to enter into a reciprocal agreement for cooperation in the furnishing of police services upon the terms that the parties deem advisable.<sup>3</sup>

### **Applicable Law and Discussion**

Under the Dillon Rule of strict construction, municipal corporations possess and may exercise only those powers expressly granted by the General Assembly, powers necessarily or fairly implied from such express powers, and those powers that are essential and indispensable.<sup>4</sup> Section 15.2-1102 confers general police powers on cities and towns which are not:

expressly prohibited by the Constitution and the general laws of the Commonwealth, and which are necessary or desirable to secure and promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality and the safety, health, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, morals, trade, commerce and industry of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof[.]

Section 15.2-1701 requires that, “[w]hen a locality<sup>[5]</sup> provides for a police department, the chief of police shall be the chief law enforcement officer of that locality. However, in towns, the chief law-enforcement officer may be called the town sergeant.”

Statutes using the word “may” are permissive rather than mandatory.<sup>6</sup> The Charter authorizes, but does not require, the Council to appoint “a town sergeant, who shall be the conservator of the peace.”<sup>7</sup> The town sergeant would be the chief law-enforcement officer of Charlotte Court House.<sup>8</sup> The applicable rule of statutory construction requires that words be given their ordinary meaning, given the context in which they are used.<sup>9</sup> The plain and unambiguous meaning of the words used in the Charter clearly authorizes the Council to appoint a town sergeant when the Council deems such an appointment to be necessary and proper.

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<sup>3</sup>Section 2.2-505(B) requires that an opinion request from a town attorney “shall itself be in the form of an opinion embodying a precise statement of all facts together with such attorney’s legal conclusions.”

<sup>4</sup>*Norton v. City of Danville*, 268 Va. 402, 408 n.3, 602 S.E.2d 126, 129 n.3 (2004); *Arlington Co. v. White*, 259 Va. 708, 712, 528 S.E.2d 706, 708 (2000); *Bd. of Supvrs. v. Countryside Inv. Co.*, 258 Va. 497, 503, 522 S.E.2d 610, 613 (1999); *County of Fairfax v. S. Iron Works, Inc.*, 242 Va. 435, 448, 410 S.E.2d 674, 682 (1991).

<sup>5</sup>The term “locality,” as used in Title 15.2, “shall be construed to mean a county, city, or town as the context may require.” VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-102 (2008).

<sup>6</sup>*See* Op. Va. Att’y Gen.: 1992 at 133, 135; 1991 at 225, 226.

<sup>7</sup>1989 Va. Acts, *supra* note 1, at 163-64 (using permissive “Council may appoint”).

<sup>8</sup>*See* § 15.2-1701 (2008) (providing that chief law-enforcement officer of town may be called town sergeant).

<sup>9</sup>*Va. Beach v. Bd. of Supvrs.*, 246 Va. 233, 236, 435 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1993).

Section 15.2-1726 authorizes localities to enter into reciprocal agreements concerning consolidation of police departments or for cooperation in furnishing police services and provides that:

Any locality may, in its discretion, enter into a *reciprocal agreement* with any other locality, ..., for such periods and under such conditions as the contracting parties deem advisable, for *cooperation* in the furnishing of police services.... The governing body of any locality also may, in its discretion, enter into a *reciprocal agreement* with any other locality, or combination thereof, for the *consolidation* of police departments or divisions or departments thereof. Subject to the conditions of the agreement, all police officers, officers, agents and other employees of such consolidated or cooperating police departments shall have the same powers, rights, benefits, privileges and immunities in every jurisdiction subscribing to such agreement, including the authority to make arrests in every such jurisdiction subscribing to the agreement .... [Emphasis added.]

In interpreting a specific inquiry related to § 15.2-1726, a 2008 opinion<sup>10</sup> (the “2008 Opinion”) concluded that a municipality that does not have a police charter or a police force may not enter into a reciprocal agreement with another municipality that has a police charter and police force. For purposes of the 2008 Opinion only, “a municipality with ‘no police charter’ means a municipality that has not enacted an ordinance authorizing a police force pursuant to § 15.2-1701 or one that does not have a charter providing for the establishment of a police force.”<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the 2008 Opinion relied upon a 1986 opinion (the “1986 Opinion”) interpreting portions of § 15.1-131.3, predecessor to § 15.2-1726, as being “uniquely applicable to the consolidation of *police* departments.”<sup>12</sup> Because the requesting county did not have a police force at the time of the proposed reciprocal agreement, the predecessor statute to § 15.2-1726 did not authorize two towns to contract with that county to have the county sheriff serve as chief of police for the towns and to provide law-enforcement services for the three localities.

The General Assembly has not substantially amended or changed the portion of § 15.2-1726 providing for “consolidation of police departments” considered by the Attorney General in the 1986 Opinion. While an opinion of the Attorney General is not binding on the courts of the Commonwealth, it is entitled to due consideration.<sup>13</sup> “The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.”<sup>14</sup> Therefore, § 15.2-1726 does not permit localities to contract for the consolidation of the police departments of separate localities when one of the contracting localities does not have a police department.

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<sup>10</sup>2008 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. No. 08-028, available at <http://www.vaag.com/OPINIONS/2008opns/08-028-Jones.pdf>.

<sup>11</sup>*Id.* at n.1.

<sup>12</sup>*Id.* (quoting 1986-1987 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 130, 132 n.1) (emphasis in original).

<sup>13</sup>*See* Twietmeyer v. City of Hampton, 255 Va. 387, 393, 497 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1998) (quoting Va. Beach v. Va. Rest. Ass’n, 231 Va. 130, 135, 341 S.E.2d 198, 201 (1986)).

<sup>14</sup>*Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth*, 225 Va. 157, 161, 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983) (quoting *Richard L. Deal & Assocs. v. Commonwealth*, 224 Va. 618, 622, 299 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1983)).

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Section 15.2-1726 also permits localities to enter into reciprocal agreements “for cooperation in the furnishing of police services.” Based upon the definitions of “reciprocal”<sup>15</sup> and “reciprocity,”<sup>16</sup> the 2008 Opinion concluded that there must be mutual or bilateral action.<sup>17</sup> Consequently, all contracting localities must have a police department before they may enter into reciprocal agreements “for cooperation in the furnishing of police services.”<sup>18</sup>

You advise that Charlotte Court House has contracted with Drakes Branch to use the Drakes Branch town sergeant to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth within Charlotte Court House. You also advise that the town charters of both Drakes Branch and Charlotte Court House have provisions authorizing the appointment of a town sergeant.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, I conclude that Charlotte Court House is authorized to enter into a reciprocal agreement with Drakes Branch pursuant to § 15.2-1726.

### Conclusion

Accordingly, it is my opinion that the Town of Charlotte Court House is authorized to appoint a town sergeant and any other necessary officers to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth within the Town. It further is my opinion that Charlotte Court House is authorized to enter into a reciprocal agreement with the Town of Drakes Branch pursuant to § 15.2-1726.

Thank you for letting me be of service to you.

Sincerely,



Robert F. McDonnell

1:213; 1:941/08-076

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<sup>15</sup> See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “reciprocal” to mean “[d]irected by each toward the other or others; MUTUAL” or “BILATERAL”).

<sup>16</sup> See *id.* at 1298 (defining “reciprocity” to mean “[t]he mutual concession of advantages or privileges for purposes of commercial or diplomatic relations”).

<sup>17</sup> See 2008 Op. Va. Att’y Gen., *supra* note 10.

<sup>18</sup> Section 15.2-1726 (2008).

<sup>19</sup> See 1989 Va. Acts *supra* note 1, § 4.1, at 263-64 (authorizing town sergeant for Charlotte Court House); see also 1998 Va. Acts ch. 275, at 405, 405 (amending § 3 of Drakes Branch charter to remove mandatory office of sergeant and providing that town officers include mayor, six council members, “and such other officers as the council *may* deem proper and necessary”) (emphasis in original).